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Abstract
In this paper, we study the citation decision of a scientific author. By citing a
related work, authors can make their arguments more persuasive. We call this the
correlation effect. But if authors cite other work, they may give the impression
that they think the cited work is more competent than theirs. We call this the
reputation effect. These two effects may be the main sources of citation bias. We
empirically show that there is a citation bias in Economics by using data from
RePEc. We also report how the citation bias differs across regions (U.S., Europe
and Asia).
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: D81
Keywords: citation bias, correlation effect, reputation effect, signal, strategy,
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1. Introduction
Scientific progress is achieved cumulatively by individual efforts of scientists. Scientists keep
doing research even if they can hardly expect to get paid much for it. Presumably, to most
scientists, the driving force of their research would not be monetary rewards, but receiving
recognition for it.
Since Shepard’s Citations initiated as legal citators in 1873, ISI (Institute for Scientific
Information) introduced various citation indices have been used to measure a scientist’s
contribution1 to his discipline.

As a result, those indices have significantly influenced

tenure, promotion and reappointment evaluations as well as other decisions in universities or
research institutions, like merit pay or endowed chairs. These decisions are taken under the
assumption that citations reflect the true quality of the researcher. What if there were some
strategic aspects in citations? We investigate here whether there is some distortion in citation
patterns.
For this purpose, we examine the correlation between an author’s rank and the average
rank of those he or she cites.2 Figure 1 shows this. If there were no citation bias, the citation
line would be horizontal.

No matter who cites, the pool of cited works would be similar.

1

The word “contribution” is rather ambiguous in this context. Note that quality and influence cannot be
identified, although they may be correlated. Then, it is not clear whether contribution refers to quality or
influence.
2
We use data from the RePEc (Research Papers in Economics), which is a decentralized database of working
papers, journal articles and professional books. For more details on RePEc, see http://repec.org/ or Krichel
(2000). Detailed variable descriptions are given in Table 1.
1

However, a positive slope of the citation line drawn in Figure 1 suggests that there is a bias in
the citation pattern.

In particular, the figure shows that authors tend to cite other authors

whose ranks are higher than themselves.

The goal of this paper is to explain the

phenomenon of such an upward bias in citation.
Our argument in explaining an upward citation bias starts from our fundamental view on
citation, namely, “Citing is a strategy.”

It is told that many scientific authors experience the

embarrassing moment of finding their work not being cited in closely related works by others.
Why have the latter authors failed to cite predating related works at the expense of
embarrassing or even offending someone?

There must be a gain from doing so.

Scientific

authors decide whether to cite a related work strategically by comparing the cost and the
benefit of citing it. The decision is not entirely taken with honesty or scholarly conscience in
mind.3
The benefit that an author can get from citing a related work is apparent. Above all things,
it makes his argument more persuasive.

Readers will believe that his argument is more

likely to be correct or believable if it is supported by a closely related argument that was made

3

For example, Palevitz (1997) writes about his experience where he found a paper omitting to cite his work
even though the paper is on a subject almost identical to that covered in his work and one of the authors knew
about his work when they wrote the paper. The reader must surely have had similar experiences. Also,
Armstrong and Wright (2007) demonstrate using a well cited article in Marketing that it is most often cited
inappropriately (not at all, not in the proper context, or with an erroneous understanding of the article). For
example, we cite Armstrong and Wright (2007) based on its abstract, but we have not read the paper.

2

independently by someone else. We call this the correlation effect, because the effect is
mainly due to the correlation between the truth of the two arguments.

Clearly, the

correlation effect of citing is larger, that is, his argument will be perceived to be more
convincing, if the related argument was advanced by a more competent author.

For example,

we say “Confucius said that ...,” but we seldom say “My friend Charles said that ...,” to try to
convince others of his argument.
This consideration may create some cost in citing a work by others. To elaborate, if an
author cites someone else's work, it may give the impression that he thinks that the cited
author is more competent than himself.

This may make an author reluctant to cite the work

by others, especially by less established authors.
through damaging his reputation.

This cost of citing is generated mainly

So, we will call this the reputation effect.

By omitting to

cite a related work of less established authors deliberately, he can establish the reputation that
he at least thinks himself more competent than the author he ought to cite but did not cite.
Thus, an author’s failure to cite someone else's related work has a vaulting effect in the sense
that he intends to jump in reputation by using someone else as a vaulting tool. There are
also minor costs of citing.
to the author and to readers.

An author cannot cite all the related works. It is burdensome both
Moreover, it is costly to search for all the relevant works.4

4

We neglect here the strategy of citing journal editors or potential referees, something we cannot control for in
our empirical work.
3

This paper consists of a theoretical part and an empirical part.

In the theory part, we

build a simple model to explain an author's citation decision. As we argued above, we
identify two main effects, the correlation effect and the reputation effect.

By the correlation

effect, an author tends to cite only competent authors whose claims are likely to be correct,
because citing a related claim by less competent authors may make his own claim look less
likely to be true.

Also, the reputation effect makes an author, particularly who is less reputed,

even more selective in citing.

This is because for an author whose academic ability is not

yet widely known to cite a less competent author may give a bad signal about his ability.
The two effects lead to citation bias.
In the empirical part, we show using data from RePEc that there does exist a citation bias
in Economics.

The most difficult part in this empirical research is to choose a proxy

variable for the reputation of an author.

For this purpose, we distinguish two individual

ranking variables RANK and RANK_NW.

The former refers to the overall rank of an author

in RePEc using a set of 31 different criteria and the latter refers to his rank only determined
by the number of authored works weighted by a simple impact factor.
RANK_NW does not take the number of citations into account.

Thus, the variable

The variable RANK, which

reflects the number of citations, is used as a proxy for an author’s reputation.
A striking fact that we obtain is that, the citation pattern of similarly ranked authors in

4

terms of RANK_NW can be U-shaped with respect to RANK.

This implies that the average

rank of authors that an author cites may decrease as the author is less reputed, and then finally
increase if the reputation of the author falls very low. This seems to support that the reputation
effect exists, since it can be interpreted as the correlation effect dominated by the reputation
effect for authors with intermediate reputation. This is not observed for all author groups, in
particular the pattern is only declining for the top authors.
As a rough proxy for an author’s recognizability, we may alternatively use his seniority.
We find a more severe citation bias among junior authors, that is, juniors are more selective in
citations, which shows an evidence of the reputation effect. We also observe that the number
of citations per article is significantly different across regions (U.S., Europe and Asia)
conditional on the variable RANK.

This can be viewed as another evidence of citation bias.

Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set up a model and provide a
theoretical analysis of an author's citation decision.

To separate the correlation effect from

the reputation effect, we consider two distinct cases when an author's ability is fully known to
all other potential authors and when his ability is known only to a limited number of them.
Section 3 contains the empirical analysis supporting the results derived in Section 2.
Concluding remarks and some suggestions follow in Section 4.

5

2. Model
To explain citation bias, we consider the following model.
makes a claim ω1 in his writing.

A scientific author (author 1)

This claim can be either true or false.

probability (or belief) that ω1 is true is μ1 ∈ (0,1) .

The prior

We can interpret μ1 as the ability of the

author. The author decides whether to cite a related claim ω2 by another author (author 2).
The probability that ω2 is true is μ 2 ∈ (0,1) .
We assume that the author is a risk-neutral Bayesian decision-maker, that is, he
maximizes the posterior probability (or belief) that his claim is true.

Thus, he decides to cite

ω2 if it increases the posterior probability that ω1 is true. Let P (ω1 = T | ω2 = T ) = α T
and P (ω1 = F | ω2 = F ) = α F .

We assume that α T , α F > 1 / 2 , i.e., the two claims are

correlated.5 We also assume that α T and α F are common knowledge.

2.1 Complete Information
Consider the case that μ1 and μ 2 are both common knowledge.

If author 1 cites ω2 , the

posterior belief that claim 1 is true is
P(ω1 = T | ω2 ) = P(ω1 = T | ω2 = T ) P(ω2 = T ) + P(ω1 = T | ω2 = F ) P(ω2 = F )
= α T μ 2 + (1 − α F )(1 − μ 2 ).
Since the probability that ω1 = T with no citation is P (ω1 = T ) = μ1 , he chooses to cite ω2
5

This assumption implies that we do not consider negative citations saying, “I claim ω1 , although author 2
claimed ω 2 that looks contrary to my claim.”
6

if and only if

μ1 < μ 1 ≡ α T μ 2 + (1 − α F )(1 − μ 2 ). 6

(1)

For the following, we assume that μ 1 ∈ (0,1) . Inequality (1) implies that a less capable
author is more likely to cite another of given capability. The intuition is quite clear. A less
capable author can increase the posterior belief that his claim is correct if he cites the claim by
a reasonably competent author, whereas a more capable one only decreases the posterior
belief by citing the claim. We call this the correlation effect of citation.
Rewriting inequality (1) leads to our result of selective citation in the case of complete
information.

Proposition 1:

μ2 = μ 2 ≡
Proof.

When μ1 is publicly known, author 1 cites ω2 if and only if

μ1 + α F − 1
.
αT + α F −1
Note that α T + α F > 1 . Thus, it is clear that inequality (1) is equivalent to

μ2 > μ 2 .

Proposition 1 suggests that an author cites only the claim made by competent authors.
He is reluctant to cite an unreliable author's claim ( μ 2 < μ 2 ). The intuition behind this result

6

Strictly speaking, it is more sensible to interpret μ i as the probability that the public believe ω i is true.

7

is as follows.

Given reasonably high α T and α F , if μ 2 is large, ω2 is likely to be

correct, which in turn implies that ω1 looks correct by citing ω2 because of high α T .
Similarly, if μ 2 is small, ω2 is likely to be false, implying that citing ω2 makes ω 1 look
false because of high α F .
Also, let us consider the specific case that α T = α F ≡ α . If μ 2 > 1 / 2 , the citation benefit
gets larger as α increases, so that author 1 is more willing to cite ω2 . In an extreme that

α ≈ 1 , he cites as long as the cited author’s known ability is higher than his own. However,
if μ 2 < 1 / 2 , the citation has a worse effect as α increases. The intuition is clear. As the
two claims are more closely related, the truth of ω2 is more likely to imply the truth of ω1 ,
while the falseness of ω2 is more likely to imply the falseness of ω1 . When μ1 = μ 2 ≡ μ ,
inequality (1) holds if μ < 1 / 2 but does not if μ > 1 / 2 , implying that an incompetent author
( μ < 1 / 2 ) always cites the claim by a comparable author, while a competent author does not.

2.2 Incomplete Information
To identify the second effect of citation, consider the alternative case that μ1 is known only
to a limited proportion of the public.

Thus, we assume that a proportion λ of the

population knows μ1 for λ ∈ (0,1) , while the rest do not know μ1 but only know its

8

distribution G ( μ1 ) , where G ( μ1 ) is defined over (0, 1).7

We will call μ1 the type of

author 1. We retain the assumption that μ 2 is common knowledge.8 One can imagine that
author 2 is a widely known scholar, while author 1 is a junior scholar who has just entered
academics.
Under incomplete information, the citation decision of an author may convey some
meaningful information about μ1 . Since the citation decision depends on μ1 in the model
of complete information, the public may be able to infer the author's unknown ability from his
citation decision. Taking this into account, an author with unknown ability may cite more
selectively to pretend to be more capable.

We call this the reputation effect of citation.

To show the reputation effect formally, we resort to the usual solution concept, the weak
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE), which requires the belief of the public to be updated
from the prior belief according to Bayes' law whenever possible. Our interest is confined to
the equilibrium outcome that some types of author 1 cite while other types do not.9 In this
equilibrium, there must be a type who is indifferent between citing or not citing ω2 under
incomplete information. Let this type be μ~1 . Then, we have

7

For example, it is usual that the ability of a freshly minted Ph. D. is known only locally.
When μ 2 is unknown, risk-averse authors should be less willing to cite him than the author whose μ is
known. This is a situation quite plausible in reality, as our empirical analysis will show, but it is beyond the
scope of our theoretical analysis.
9
This is a semi-separating equilibrium outcome. We will not consider the uninteresting pooling case where no
types cite.
8

9

Proposition 2: (i) Author 1 cites ω2 if μ1 ≤ μ~1 (λ ) , while he does not if μ1 > μ~1 (λ ) , (ii)

μ~1 (λ ) < μ1 , and (iii) μ~1 (λ ) is strictly increasing in λ .
Proof.

See appendix.

This proposition says that a more severe citation bias occurs due to the reputation effect.
A less widely known author tends to be more reluctant to cite others. The intuition goes as
follows. Citing has two effects. On one hand, it directly increases the credibility of his claim
(correlation effect), but, on the other hand, it has an indirect signaling effect; adjusting the
belief of his ability downwards (reputation effect). Thus, an author decides whether to cite
or not by taking the two effects into account. So, the citing decision of an author with a very
high μ1 (and a very low μ1 respectively) will never (hardly respectively) be affected by the
incomplete information, but an agent with a medium range μ1 , especially close to μ1 ,
who would cite under complete information would rather opt not to cite under incomplete
information if he takes account of the extra reputation effect.
In this model, an author’s attempt to signal by omitting to cite deliberately gives the same
reputation benefits across types, but is more costly to a type of lower μ1 because he is giving
up providing more convincing argument to informed readers. Due to a difference in this
signaling cost, separation is possible.

10

3. Empirical Evidence
We use citation data from the RePEc. As of Februry 2007, the RePEc database holds
close to 450,000 items of interest in Economics and related fields. In addition, 12,205 authors
are registered through the RePEc Author Service,10 each having contact information and a list
of publications catalogued in RePEc. Finally, the Citations in Economics (CitEc) project11
performs citation analysis on items in RePEc, which then allows to constitute rankings of all
registered authors.
An author's overall rank is determined by taking a harmonic mean of his ranks in 31
different rankings based on citations, impact factors and paper downloads, removing the best
and worst ranks.12 From 12,205 registered authors, we collect the information given in Table
1. (Insert Table 1 here.)
In Figure 1, we plot the RANK_CITED variable with respect to the author's rank (RANK).
We exclude the authors whose RANK_CITED values are zero. It can indeed happen that none
of the cited authors are registered, or that references could not be found for any of the author’s
works, especially if he has few of them. Thus 9,127 of 12,205 authors are considered in the

10
11
12

See http://authors.repec.org/ or Barrueco Cruz, Klink and Krichel (2000).
See http://citec.repec.org/ or Barrueco Cruz and Krichel (2005).
For details, see http://ideas.repec.org/top/ or Zimmermann (2007).
11

simulation. The figure reveals that the citation pattern line is not horizontal,13 that is, the
citation pattern is dependent on the author's rank (RANK), implying that citation bias does
exist. (Insert Figure 1 here.)

To show that the slope of the citation pattern line is

significantly different from zero, we estimate the following regression equation;
RANK _ CITED = β 0 + β1 ∗ RANK + e.

Here, the estimate for β 1 is 0.05 with a standard error of 0.002 and thus we can reject
the hypothesis that β 1 = 0. Also, a positive slope of the citation pattern line is consistent
with our theoretical result that authors tend to cite other authors with higher ranks than their
own.
To examine the citation pattern from another angle, we draw 91 rank groups by assigning
about 100 authors to each group according to their ranks. For each author, 1 is given if the
RANK_CITED value is larger than the RANK value14 and otherwise, 0 is given. Then, the

average of the indicator values is computed for each rank group. The graphical result is
reported in Figure 2.

(Insert Figure 2 here.)

With no citation bias, the graph would decline smoothly. In Figure 2, however, the graph
falls rapidly and we clearly observe that the averaged indicator values are recorded as zero

13
14

The citation pattern line is plotted by using the Lowess smoothing method.
This implies that the selected author's rank is higher than the average rank of his cited authors.
12

from the 24th rank group.15 This means at least that the authors in the middle range are
unlikely to cite the authors with lower ranks than their own. Accordingly, Figure 2 is
consistent with Proposition 2 saying that citation bias is more severe among less established
authors if we interpret those authors with intermediate ranks as less established ones while
interpreting the top ranking authors as established.
To test the citation bias solely due to the reputation effect, we need a proxy for the
reputation of an author. We may think of several candidates for the proxy.
First, we pay attention to the difference between RANK and RANK_NW.

We use

variable RANK_NW as a proxy of the true ability of an author,16 and variable RANK for a
proxy of his overall ability including his reputation.17 We group authors by RANK_NW
assigning about 400 authors in each group, and take the upper 10% and 50% groups. In
Figure 3, we present two regression-fitted lines denoted by the dashed line (upper 10%) and
the solid line (upper 50%). (Insert Figure 3 here.)

Interestingly, it is displayed that the

dashed line shows the negative slope with respect to the proxy variable for an author’s
reputation, RANK. This suggests that a less reputed author is likely to cite high-ranking

15

Approximately 2407th – 2518th ranked authors are allocated to the 24th rank group.
An author’s performance in terms of journal publication can be a reasonable proxy for his ability insofar as
the refereeing process in academic journals is fair. See Kim and Park (2006) for the possibility of the unfair
refereeing process especially in single-blinded journals.
17
We can justify this choice of variable RANK for measuring the reputation as follows. As in the argument in
footnote 5, risk-averse authors are reluctant to cite an author whose ability is not widely known. In fact, many
authors seldom cite unfamiliar names. So, RANK of a less reputed author is likely to be lower than his
RANK_NW.
16

13

authors more selectively due to the reputation effect. From the solid curve, it is predicted
that the authors up to the 4000th show a negative slope, while those of lower ranks than the
6000th show a positive slope. This can be also interpreted as their reputation effect almost
balanced with the correlation effect at the minimum point. Overall, our theoretical result
supports a U-shaped curve.18
Second, as an alternative proxy to the recognizability of an author, we use his seniority.
More specifically, to distinguish the reputation effect from the correlation effect, we classify
authors into two groups, seniors and juniors, 19
RANK_NW and RANK_CITED in Figure 4.

and then plot the relation between

While positive slopes of the fitted lines

represent the bias due to the correlation effect, a lower fitted line for juniors than for seniors
clearly show that there is a bias due to the reputation effect. In other words, juniors are more
selective in their citations.
Finally, we add the empirical evidence of the risk-avoiding effect informally discussed in
footnote 8 by identifying bias towards citations of authors from prestigious institutions. In
fact, an author’s affiliation with a well known university helps getting his work widely
recognized and frequently cited. Testing the citation bias that occurs due to the author’s
18

Table 2 shows that the observed shapes of two fitting curves in Figure 3 are supported by the regression
model estimation. The quadratic regression model for the upper 50% indicates the positive and negative
significance for the squared term, and the linear model for the upper 10% indicates the negative significance for
variable RANK. The squared term for RANK in the model with the upper 10% authors is estimated to be
insignificant. (Insert Table 2 here)
19
Here, we define junior authors by ones whose publication was within 3 years.
14

affiliation, we provide summary statistics in Table 3. (Insert Table 3 here.)
We find that citation bias exists, depending on the author affiliation. Authors affiliated
with institutions from the USA or Canada are more likely to be cited than those in other
continents.

Of course, this may be due to their relatively higher rankings rather than due to

citation bias. To examine the citation bias controlled by the rank of authors, we propose the
following regression model. Compared to the previous estimation model, we replace the
RANK variable with the RANK_NW variable to avoid the simultaneity problem between
AVE_CITING and RANK;
AVE _ CITING = β 0 + β 1 RANK _ NW + β 2 AFFI 2 + β 3 AFFI 3 + ei ,

where AFFI2 (Europe) and AFFI3 (Others) are dummy variables for the affiliation regions.
Considering that 50.1% of 11,599 new number authors have no cited records in the works of
other authors, a Tobit model is employed as the estimation approach. The coefficients and
standard errors are reported in Table 4. (Insert Table 4 here.)
In this regression, we find that the RANK_NW variable is negatively significant. After
controlling the author rank, the region dummy variables are still negatively significant at a 5%
level. Therefore, the empirical result supports the hypothesis that authors with US or Canada
affiliations are more likely to be cited than authors with other regional affiliations.

15

4. Conclusion and Caveats
In this paper, we provided a theoretical model of citation and tested the results empirically.
Overall, the empirical results presented in this paper support the hypothesis that there is either
individual-based or group (geography)-based citation bias. In particular, we find evidence
for the correlation effect, namely that authors prefer to cite better ranked authors to make their
claim more legitimate. We also find evidence for the reputation effect, whereby authors cite
more selectively to avoid a signal of incompetence when there is uncertainty about their
competence.
We acknowledge, however, that authors may also take consideration of other factors, for
example psychological or political one in deciding to cite. An author may cite someone’s
work simply because he is a colleague or because he used to be the author’s advisor/student.
Or, he may not cite a work just for the reason that he does not like the author personally.
Although some citations are an outcome of such personal considerations, the inherent nature
of the citation should not be to give a favor to someone, but to cite his work because it is
relevant.
One important feature in the citation decision that we neglected to mention in this paper is
the network effect in a broad sense. It is often reported that a small group of scholars give
mutual favors by citing each other. Also, some physicists recently have identified a hub

16

structure in scientific citation networks and explained it by using preferential attachment
whereby a newcomer in a network is more likely to link to an author with more links, that is,
more likely to cite an author who is more often cited.20 The preferential attachment, which is
very crucial to a hub structure, can be interpreted as herding in an economic term,21 going like
“an author tends to cite someone else simply because many people cite him.” This may be
another source of citation bias.
Finally, it is impossible to establish whether another citation strategy is significant,
namely hat of adapting citations to the intended outlet: citing editors or potential referees,
even being asked by referees to cite them. One could argue that better established authors
would give less in to such games or that editors in better journals may not allow such behavior,
but this is only anecdotal evidence we cannot verify without dataset.
To conclude, there is a significant citation bias in academic journals. The academic
tradition of evaluating an author in terms of RANK incorporating the number of citations
clearly aggravates the bias. On this ground, we believe that RANK_NW should be more
often used to evaluate an author’s performance than RANK to mitigate the citation bias.

20

Jeong et al. (2003), for example, identify the evidence of preferential attachment in the science citation
network.
21
See Banerjee (1992), and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992) for informational explanations of
herding.
17

Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2: (i) Let I be the set of μ1 who does not cite in equilibrium. By the

definition of μ~1 , we have
P (ω1 = T | ω2 ) ≡ α T μ 2 + (1 − α F )(1 − μ 2 ) = V ( μ~1 ),

where V ( μ1 ) = λμ1 + (1 − λ ) E ( μ1 | I ) . Then, since V ( μ1 ) is increasing in μ1 , it is clear that
P (ω1 = T | ω2 ) < V ( μ1 ) for all μ1 > μ~1 and that P (ω1 = T | ω2 ) > V ( μ1 ) for all μ1 < μ~1 .

Also, by the definition of μ1 , we have P (ω1 = T | ω 2 ) = μ1 . This implies that

μ1 = λμ~1 + (1 − λ ) E ( μ1 | I ) .

(2)

Note that E ( μ1 | I ) > μ~1 , because I = {μ1 | μ1 > μ~1 } .

Therefore, it follows that μ1 > μ~1 .

Total differentiation of (2) directly shows the monotonicity of μ~1 (λ ) with respect to λ .
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<Table 1: variable description>
variable

Description

RANK

Author’s overall rank
Author’s rank determined by his number of works

RANK_NW
weighted by the simple impact factor of their series
Average rank of authors cited in this authors’ works:

RANK_CITED

when several authors are ranked for a cited work,
the highest rank is taken

NW_CITING

The number of works citing this author

NW_WORKS

The number of this author’s publications

AVE_CITNG

NW_CITING / NW_WORKS
Author’s affiliation:

AFFI
for multiple affiliations, the first affiliation is chosen

20

< Table 2: Quadratic and linear estimation >

Quadratic regression model: upper 50% group
variable

coefficient

standard error

t-value

p-value

RANK

-0.556

0.180

-3.08

0.002

(RANK)2

4.19e-05

1.71e-05

2.45

0.015

Linear regression model: upper 10% group
variable

coefficient

standard error

t-value

p-value

RANK

-0.105

0.034

-3.07

0.002

<Table 3: Summary statistics>
Affiliated region

obs

NW_CITING

AVE_CITING

USA & Canada

3,743

52.1

1.27

Europe

6,394

11.42

0.39

Others

1,462

5.98

0.27

Note: 11,599 of 12,205 authors are considered and authors with no explicit affiliation are excluded.

21

<Table 4: Tobit model estimation>

variable

coefficient

standard error

t-value

p-value

RANK_NW

-0.00066

0.00001

-60.76

0.000

AFFI2

-0.438

0.0648

-6.76

0.000

AFFI3

-0.452

0.105

-4.29

0.000

logL

-15536.89
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<Figure 1: RANK_CITED vs. RANK>
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<Figure 2: Average of indicator values for each rank group>
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<Figure 3: upper 10% and 50% RANK_NW groups>
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<Figure 4: Seniors vs. Juniors>
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